An alternative incomplete information bargaining model for identifying the reasonable concession period of a BOT project

International Journal of Project Management

Volumn 33, Issue 5, 2015, Pages 1151-1159

  Bao, Haijun ^a   Peng, Yi ^a   Ablanedo Rosas, Jose Humberto ^b   Gao, Hongman ^c  

^a ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO   (United States)

^c JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining model; Build operate transfer (BOT); Concession period; Incomplete information

Indexed keywords

PROJECT MANAGEMENT; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER;

BARGAINING MODEL; BOT PROJECT; BUILD OPERATE TRANSFERS; COMPLETE INFORMATION; CONCESSION PERIODS; CRITICAL COMPONENT; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURES;

DECISION MAKING;

BARGAINING; DECISION MAKING; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84929519791     PISSN: 02637863     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.12.004     Document Type: Article

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