A strategy-proof combinatorial heterogeneous channel auction framework in noncooperative wireless networks

IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing

Volumn 14, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 1123-1137

  Zheng, Zhenzhe ^a   Wu, Fan ^a   Chen, Guihai ^a  

^a SHANGHAI JIAO TONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

channel allocation; combinatorial auction; Wireless network

Indexed keywords

DESIGN; REUSABILITY; SCHEDULING; TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING; WIRELESS NETWORKS;

AUCTION MECHANISMS; BETTER PERFORMANCE; CHANNEL ALLOCATION; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; EVALUATION RESULTS; HETEROGENEOUS CHANNELS; SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;

WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

EID: 84929191603     PISSN: 15361233     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2014.2343624     Document Type: Article

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