Walrasian economics in retrospect

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 115, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 1411-1439

  Bowles, Samuel ^a   Gintis, Herbert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000784540     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355300555006     Document Type: Article

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