An empirical example of the Condorcet paradox of voting in a large electorate

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 135-145

  Kurrild Klitgaard, Peter ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035644413     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010304729545     Document Type: Article

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