The Rochester school: The origins of positive political theory

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 2, Issue , 1999, Pages 269-295

  Amadae, S M ^a   Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision making; Game theory; Rational choice; Spatial models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033473438     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.269     Document Type: Article

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