Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 1, Issue , 1998, Pages 259-287

  Austen Smith, David ^a   Banks, Jeffrey S ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Core existence; Minimal democracy; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032350207     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259     Document Type: Article

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