Strategy-proofness and markets

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 37-58

  Satterthwaite, Mark A ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035583292     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000056     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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