The economic vote: How political and economic institutions condition election results

The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-402

  Duch, Raymond M ^a   Stevenson, Randolph T ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925099334     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511755934     Document Type: Book

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