Economics and politics revisited: Exploring the decline in conservative support, 1992-1995

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 139-151

  Evans, Geoffrey ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032647320     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00193     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. 1 The British Election Panel Study data used in this analysis were collected under the auspices of the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends (CREST). CREST is an ESRC designated research centre (Award no. M 303 253 001) linking Nuffield College and Social & Community Planning Research directed by Anthony Heath and Roger Jowell and co-funded by the Sainsbury Charitable Trusts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the PSA specialist group on Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, Sheffield, September 1996.
2. 2 See, among others, D. Sanders, 'Government popularity and the next general election', Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; D. Sanders, 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 203-31; S. Price and D. Sanders, 'Economic expectations and voting intentions in the UK, 1979-87: a pooled cross-sectional analysis', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 451-71; D. Sanders and S. Price, 'Party Support and Economic Perceptions in the UK 1979-87: a Two-level Approach', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton (eds), the British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 1994 (London, Frank Cass, 1995). See also H. Clarke, M. C. Stewart and P. Whiteley, 'Tory trends: Party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992', British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997), 299-319.
3. 2 See, among others, D. Sanders, 'Government popularity and the next general election', Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; D. Sanders, 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 203-31; S. Price and D. Sanders, 'Economic expectations and voting intentions in the UK, 1979-87: a pooled cross-sectional analysis', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 451-71; D. Sanders and S. Price, 'Party Support and Economic Perceptions in the UK 1979-87: a Two-level Approach', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton (eds), the British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 1994 (London, Frank Cass, 1995). See also H. Clarke, M. C. Stewart and P. Whiteley, 'Tory trends: Party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992', British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997), 299-319.
4. 2 See, among others, D. Sanders, 'Government popularity and the next general election', Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; D. Sanders, 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 203-31; S. Price and D. Sanders, 'Economic expectations and voting intentions in the UK, 1979-87: a pooled cross-sectional analysis', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 451-71; D. Sanders and S. Price, 'Party Support and Economic Perceptions in the UK 1979-87: a Two-level Approach', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton (eds), the British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 1994 (London, Frank Cass, 1995). See also H. Clarke, M. C. Stewart and P. Whiteley, 'Tory trends: Party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992', British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997), 299-319.
5. 2 See, among others, D. Sanders, 'Government popularity and the next general election', Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; D. Sanders, 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 203-31; S. Price and D. Sanders, 'Economic expectations and voting intentions in the UK, 1979-87: a pooled cross-sectional analysis', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 451-71; D. Sanders and S. Price, 'Party Support and Economic Perceptions in the UK 1979-87: a Two-level Approach', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton (eds), the British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 1994 (London, Frank Cass, 1995). See also H. Clarke, M. C. Stewart and P. Whiteley, 'Tory trends: Party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992', British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997), 299-319.
6. 2 See, among others, D. Sanders, 'Government popularity and the next general election', Political Quarterly, 62 (1991), 235-61; D. Sanders, 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 203-31; S. Price and D. Sanders, 'Economic expectations and voting intentions in the UK, 1979-87: a pooled cross-sectional analysis', Political Studies, 43 (1995), 451-71; D. Sanders and S. Price, 'Party Support and Economic Perceptions in the UK 1979-87: a Two-level Approach', in C. Rallings, D. M. Farrell, D. Denver and D. Broughton (eds), the British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 1994 (London, Frank Cass, 1995). See also H. Clarke, M. C. Stewart and P. Whiteley, 'Tory trends: Party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992', British Journal of Political Science, 27 (1997), 299-319.
7. 3 Sanders 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', p. 223; see also Clarke et al., 'Tory trends', p. 3.
8. 3 Sanders 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', p. 223; see also Clarke et al., 'Tory trends', p. 3.
9. 4 The respondents in the first wave of the BEPS were those obtained for the 1992 British Election Study cross-section survey, the sample size for which (after re-weighting for a Scottish over-sample) was 2855. By the spring 1995 wave the number of respondents remaining in the panel had dropped to 1625. To correct for differential attrition, responses in all waves of the BEPS have been weighted by the distribution of votes in the 1992 sample. See B. Taylor, A. Heath and P. Lynn 'The British Election panel study 1992-5; response characteristics and attrition', CREST Working Paper no. 40 (London, SCPR & Nuffield College 1996).
10. 5 Where possible, the models shown below have been replicated across other waves of the study.
11. 6 There are also, of course, influential models of voting behaviour that focus on voters' sociological characteristics. These are not well-suited, however, to explaining short-term political change of the kind examined here. Analyses of vote switching which model the effects of social and demographic characteristics find little evidence of any pronounced tendency to defect differentially across groups (details available on request).
12. 7 See, for example, W. Hutton, The State of the Nation (London, Vintage, 1995).
13. 8 Sanders 'Economic performance, management competence and the outcome of the next general election', p. 223.
14. 9 Checks on the correlation matrix of the independent variables show that the lack of significant effects is not a result of multicollinearity (all inter-correlations are less than r = 0.30).
15. 10 See D. Kinder and D. Kiewiet, 'Sociotropic politics: the American case', British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 129-41.
16. 11 M. Fiorina, Restrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981). H. Norpoth, 'Presidents and the prospective voter', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 776-92.
17. 11 M. Fiorina, Restrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981). H. Norpoth, 'Presidents and the prospective voter', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 776-92.
18. 12 (i) 'looking back over the last year or so, would you say that your household's income has fallen behind prices, kept up with prices, or gone up by more than prices?'; (ii) 'looking forward to the year ahead, do you expect your household's income to fall behind prices, keep up with prices, or go up by more than prices?'; (iii) 'looking back over the last year or so, would you say that Britain's economy has got stronger, got weaker or stay about the same?'; (iv) 'looking forward to the year ahead, do you think Britain's economy will get stronger, get weaker or stay about the same?'.
19. 13 P. Converse, 'The nature of belief systems in mass publics', in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York, Free, 1964).
20. 14 The correlation over the period 1992-95 for both household and national retrospective perceptions is only 0.20. Correlations for period 1993-95 for household and national prospective perceptions are 0.30 and 0.33 respectively.
21. 15 There is also only a very weak association between subjective economic perceptions and the objective economic variables measured in the BEPS surveys. For national economic expectations this is not particularly concerning, our measures of respondents' objective economic attributes are concerned primarily with personal experiences, but even personal economic expectations and retrospective evaluations are difficult to model using objective indicators - a conclusion also drawn by Sanders and Price from their analysis of Gallup data; Sanders and Price 'Party support and economic perceptions in the UK 1979-87', p. 59. But if economic perceptions are genuinely appraisals of economic conditions - as is assumed by advocates of such models of government popularity - then they should have a fairly solid basis in these conditions. That does not appear to be the case (details available on request).
22. 15 There is also only a very weak association between subjective economic perceptions and the objective economic variables measured in the BEPS surveys. For national economic expectations this is not particularly concerning, our measures of respondents' objective economic attributes are concerned primarily with personal experiences, but even personal economic expectations and retrospective evaluations are difficult to model using objective indicators - a conclusion also drawn by Sanders and Price from their analysis of Gallup data; Sanders and Price 'Party support and economic perceptions in the UK 1979-87', p. 59. But if economic perceptions are genuinely appraisals of economic conditions - as is assumed by advocates of such models of government popularity - then they should have a fairly solid basis in these conditions. That does not appear to be the case (details available on request).
23. 16 This wording and the topics listed are taken from the Gallup series on this theme.
24. 17 This distinction is supported by a principal components analysis which indicates that assessments of the government's record on the NHS and education formed the core of the first principal component - with unemployment also loading somewhat more weakly onto this dimension - while national and personal standard of living loaded onto the second principal component and taxation loaded clearly onto a third (details available on request).
25. 18 In the 1992 survey respondents were asked about their appraisals of changes since the general election of June 1987.
26. 19 When changes in retrospective economic evaluations over the previous 12 months are added to this model they also fail to have significant effects. Further analysis of the pattern of relations between appraisals of various aspects of the government's record and attitudes towards the Conservatives shows that the links between party support and aspects of the government's record changed over time. Thus a principal components analysis shows that in 1992 both national and personal standard of living loaded onto the first principal component along with attitudes towards the Conservatives. By 1994, however, these two items loaded onto a distinct second dimension: while attitudes towards the Conservatives loaded onto the first principal component along with assessments of the government's record on the NHS, education, and unemployment (details available).
27. 20 They are also unaffected when controls for long-term stability in Conservative partisanship, as indicated by whether respondents reported voting Conservative in 1987 or not, are added to these models - thus indicating that these effects are not merely a proxy for weaker prior partisan attachments.
28. 21 Given the surprising nature of this finding, further checks were made on the characteristics of the logistic models and the variable used to measure changes in perceptions of party divisions. These checks showed that there is a weak zero-order effect on vote switching for changes in perceptions of division within the Conservative Party, which is removed when other image measures are modelled concurrently. None the less, the level of correlation between the image items is not so high as to produce undesirably high standard errors, while variance in the measure of changes in perceptions of Conservative Party division is not so truncated as to prevent its effects being observed. Thus the conclusion that changes in perceptions of division within the party are not responsible for defection from Conservative support stands.
29. 22 These findings might appear inconsistent with those of aggregate-level analyses of the role of economic perceptions in government popularity. However, if only a small minority of voters react politically to their own, or the country's, economic circumstances while the rest contribute random error we would find an aggregate-level correlation between economic perceptions and government popularity. Moreover, if party perceptions had been included in aggregate-level models of government popularity these analyses might also have found economic perceptions to be of minor significance.
30. 23 See T. Holbrook and J. C. Garand, 'Homo economus? Economic information and economic voting', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 351-75.
31. 24 Sanders and Price, 'Party support and economic perceptions in the UK 1979-87', p. 59.