Regulatory bargaining and public law

Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-274

  Rossi, Jim ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84922848040     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511080     Document Type: Book

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