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85169242785
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15 U.S.C. 1-7 and 15 U.S.C. 12-27
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1. 15 U.S.C. 1-7 and 15 U.S.C. 12-27.
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2
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85169268086
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It is important to note that it is not a crime to be a monopolist or charge monopoly prices. Instead, the crimes are in how the monopolist became a monopolist or how the monopolist maintained that monopoly position
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2. It is important to note that it is not a crime to be a monopolist or charge monopoly prices. Instead, the crimes are in how the monopolist became a monopolist or how the monopolist maintained that monopoly position.
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3
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85169258713
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See Keough v. Chicago and Northwest Railroad, 260 US 156 (1922)
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3. See Keough v. Chicago and Northwest Railroad, 260 US 156 (1922).
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4
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85169231580
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See Parker v. Brown, 317 US 341 (1943)
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4. See Parker v. Brown, 317 US 341 (1943).
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5
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85169268445
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100 S.Ct. 937 (1980)
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5. 100 S.Ct. 937 (1980).
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6
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85169242791
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Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 US 366 (1973), is an exception
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6. Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 US 366 (1973), is an exception.
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7
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85169233151
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O.R.C. 4905.32
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7. O.R.C. 4905.32.
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8
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85169238209
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O.R.C. 4905.33. O.R.C. 4905.34 provides an exception to O.R.C. 4905.33 for government customers
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8. O.R.C. 4905.33. O.R.C. 4905.34 provides an exception to O.R.C. 4905.33 for government customers.
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9
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85169243652
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O.R.C. 4905.35
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9. O.R.C. 4905.35.
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10
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85169263558
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See NRC Dockets 50-346 and 50-440
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10. See NRC Dockets 50-346 and 50-440.
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11
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85169269498
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See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's Opinion and Order of April 11, 1996, in the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's Rate Case and Toledo Edison Company's Rate Case, Case Nos. 95-299-EL-AIR and 95-300-EL-AIR, respectively
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11. See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's Opinion and Order of April 11, 1996, in the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company's Rate Case and Toledo Edison Company's Rate Case, Case Nos. 95-299-EL-AIR and 95-300-EL-AIR, respectively.
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12
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85169270321
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See Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Com., 678 N.E.2d 922 (1997)
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12. See Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Com., 678 N.E.2d 922 (1997).
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13
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85169249454
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See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's Opinion and Order of August 31, 1995 in Youngstown Thermal v. Ohio Edison Co., Case No. 93-1408-EL-CSS
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13. See Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's Opinion and Order of August 31, 1995 in Youngstown Thermal v. Ohio Edison Co., Case No. 93-1408-EL-CSS.
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14
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85169265563
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PUCO News Release and Marketing Program Policy Statement, Nov. 6, 1996
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14. PUCO News Release and Marketing Program Policy Statement, Nov. 6, 1996.
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15
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85169259608
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447 U.S. 557 (1980)
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15. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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18
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Typically, the State Attorney General
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18. Typically, the State Attorney General.
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19
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85169262367
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note
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19. In Pennsylvania, the Commission is empowered to monitor the market for supply and distribution, and to look at "the effect of mergers, consolidations, acquisition or disposition of assets or securities of electricity suppliers, transmission congestion and anti-competitive or discriminatory conduct..." 66 PA. C.S. 2811. If the Commission determines that it is necessary to prevent or restrain a violation of federal or state law, it must give the electric supplier reasonable notice and the opportunity to prevent or limit disclosure before the Commission turns the information over to the appropriate federal or state law enforcement officials. Interestingly, if the Commission has reason to believe that there is an unlawful exercise of market power, it is instructed to refer its findings to the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Once one of these entities begins a proceeding, the Commission is authorized to intervene.
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