Litigation versus legislation: Forum shopping by rent seekers

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 295-310

  Rubin, Paul H ^a   Curran, Christopher ^a   Curran, John F ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Chicago Mercantile Exchange   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035645110     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010337522287     Document Type: Article

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