Demons and the isolation argument

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 220, 2005, Pages 403-408

  Hendricks, Scott ^a  

^a CLARK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949419467     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00407.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. R. Fumerton, 'Theories of Justification', in P. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 204-33, at p. 205
2. L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard UP, 1985), p. 8
3. A. Goldman, 'What is Justified Belief?', in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23
4. See Goldman, 'What is Justified Belief?', and also his Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard UP, 1986)
5. C. Sartwell, 'Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief', Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992), pp. 167-80
6. Bonjour, 'The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 117-42
7. See also M. Williams, 'Scepticism', in Greco and Sosa, pp. 35-69, for basically the same application of this insight
8. S. Cohen, 'Justification and Truth', Philosophical Studies, 46 (1984), pp. 279-96, is the exception
9. C. Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (MIT Press, 1992)
10. J. Pollock and J. Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999)
11. See, for example, K. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder: Westview, 1990), pp. 64ff
12. M. Steup, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995)
13. Williams, 'Scepticism', p. 64 fn. 11
14. Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 143-4
15. See also his Justification, Coherence and Knowledge', Erkenntnis, 50 (1999), pp. 243-58
16. and Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn (Boulder: Westview, 2001), for a slightly modified version of his notion of undefeated justification
17. A good deal of literature has been devoted to the difference between epistemically external and internal properties. For valuable discussions, see W. Alston, 'An Internalist Externalism', Synthese, 74 (1988), pp. 265-83
18. Sosa, 'Scepticism and the Internal/External Divide', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 145-57
19. See, e.g., H. Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001)