On Dreaming and Being Lied To

Episteme

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 149-159

  Faulkner, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010653756     PISSN: 17423600     EISSN: 17500117     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.149     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Alston W. (1986). “Epistemic Circularity’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47: 1–30.
2. Audi R. (1997). “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justifi cation’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 34(4): 405–422.
3. Bacharach M. and Gambetta D. (2001). “Trust as Type Detection’, Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies, Castelfranchi C. and Tan Y.-H. (Dordrecht: Kluwer): 1–26.
4. Burge T. (1993). “Content Preservation’ Philosophical Review, 102(4): 457–488.
5. Coady C. A. J. (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
6. Descartes R. (1641). “Meditations in First Philosophy’, Descartes: Philosophical Writings, Anscombe (Sunbury-on-Thames, Nelson's University Paperbacks): 59–124.
7. Dretske F. (1970). “Epistemic Operators’ The Journal of Philosophy, 67(24): 1007–1023.
8. Dummett M. (1993). “Testimony and Memory’, The Seas of Language, Dummett M. (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 411–428.
9. Ekman P. (1988). “Why Lies Fail and What Behaviours Betray a Lie’, Credibility Assessment, Maratea, Italy (Kluwer Academic Publishers).
10. Faulkner P. (2000). “The Social Character of Testimonial Warrant’ Journal of Philosophy, 97(11): 581–601.
11. Feldman S. (1997). “Second-Person Scepticism’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 47(186): 80–84.
12. Hume D. (1740). A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
13. Hume D. (1777). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
14. Lackey J. (forthcoming). “Learning from Words’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
15. McDowell J. (1982). “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’, Meaning Knowledge and Reality McDowell, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 369–394.
16. McDowell J. (1994). “Knowledge by Hearsay’, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, McDowell J. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 414–444.
17. McDowell J. (1995). “Knowledge and the Internal’, Meaning Knowledge and Reality, McDowell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 395–413.
18. Nozick R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
19. Rosenberg J. F. (2002). Thinking about Knowing (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
20. Sosa E. (1994). “Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 263–90.
21. Sosa E. (1999). “How to Defeat Opposition To Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology, Tomberlin J. E. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell).
22. Strawson P. F. (1994). “Knowing From Words’, Knowing From Words, Matilal (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers): 23–7.
23. Stroud B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
24. Stroud B. (1989). “Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, Knowledge and Scepticism, Clay M. and Lehrer K. (Boulder, CO:, Westview): 31–50.
25. Wittgenstein L. (1969). On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
26. Wright C. (1991). “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon’, Mind, 100(397): 87–116.