Accepting testimony

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 211, 2003, Pages 256-264

  Weiner, Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748892180     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00310     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. See C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: a Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 6-7
2. E. Sosa, 'Testimony and Coherence', in B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds), Knowing from Words (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 59-67, at p. 59
3. (NSC) is much like Christopher Insole's 'common sense restraint': see his 'Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony', The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 44-56, at p. 44; my exposition of the dialectic in general owes much to Insole's
4. This is a special case of Burge's original acceptance principle, which is not restricted to testimony: see his 'Content Preservation', Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), pp. 457-88, at p. 467
5. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford UP, 1975), §X, p. 88
6. E. Fricker, 'Against Gullibility', in Matilal and Chakrabarti, pp. 125-61, at p. 134
7. I have cast this principle and the next two in the first person in order to avoid conflating evidence gathered by an individual with evidence gathered by the community, as Hume seems to: see Coady, Testimony, pp. 80-1
8. L.F. Stevenson, 'Why Believe What People Say?', Synthese, 94 (1993), pp. 429-51, at p. 437
9. Fricker, 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 393-411, at p. 402
10. (APMT) is much like the principle (TCP) proposed by Stevenson, 'Why Believe What People Say?', p. 442, who does not claim that it yields anything like (NSC)