The Character of Consciousness

The Character of Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-624

  Chalmers, David J ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Consciousness meter; Garden of Eden; Metaphysics of consciousness; Perceptual experience; The matrix; Unity of consciousness

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921607890     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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