Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-352

  Kriegel, Uriah ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Neural Correlate Of Consciousness; Phenomenal Consciousness; Qualitative Character; Reduction; Self Representationalism; Subjective Character; Subjectivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957767847     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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