A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience

Nous

Volumn 32, Issue SUPPL. 12, 1998, Pages 435-457

  Rey, Georges ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61949330294     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.19     Document Type: Article

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