The consequences of intentionalism

Erkenntnis

Volumn 66, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 247-270

  Stoljar, Daniel ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947717208     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-006-9038-6     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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