Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages

  David, Papineau ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

David Chalmers; Perceptual concepts; Phenomenal concepts; Physicalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920372946     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0007     Document Type: Chapter

References (27)

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