Qualia and analytical conditionals

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 100, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 111-135

  Braddon Mitchell, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746169424     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2003100321     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. The Conscious Mind (New York: Oxford, 1996).
2. Chalmers is the source of the current popularity of the Zombie arguments. Keith Campbell also has a nice version of the argument in Body and Mind (New York: Doubleday, 1970).
3. The term seems to enter philosophy via R. Kirk, "Zombies versus Materialists," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XLVIII (supplement) (1974): 135-52.
4. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis (New York: Oxford, 1998).
5. See David Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996).
6. I suppose this includes David Lewis, "Self-Profile," in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 412-31;
7. Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," Philosophical Studies, XXVII, 5 (1975): 292-315; and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson. I am supposing that everyone who is an analytical functionalist is also a procrustean analytical functionalist.
8. Michael Tye, "The Subjective Qualities of Experience," Mind, XCV (1986): 1-17, see pp. 5-6;
9. Stephen Yablo, "Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIII, 1 (1993): 1-42;
10. and Robert Stalnaker and Ned Block, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," Philosophical Review, CVIII (1999): 1-46.
11. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard, 1980);
12. Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in Selected Papers, Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge, 1975), pp. 215-71.
13. See Jackson, and, for a contrary view, Robert Stalnaker, "On Considering a Possible World as Actual," Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
14. L. Humberstone and M. Davies, "Two Notions of Necessity," Philosophical Studies, XXXVIII (1980): 1-30.
15. Stalnaker, "Assertion," in P. Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics, Volume IX (New York: Academic, 1978); Humberstone; Chalmers; Jackson.
16. See Chalmers, "The Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics."
17. Terminological footnotes must abound in discussions of two-dimensionalism. I use 'content' in roughly David Kaplan's sense - see his "Dthat," in P. Cole, ed., Syntax and Semantics (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 221-53
18. and his "Demonstratives," in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan (New York: Oxford, 1989) pp. 481-563; equivalent perhaps to Jackson's Gintension, and Chalmers's secondary intension.
19. Lewis, "Ramseyan Humility" (forthcoming).
20. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, "The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism," Philosophical Topics, XII, 1-2 (1999): 71-88.
21. Cf. some of the issues in Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," in his Philosophical Papers, Volume I (New York: Oxford, 1983), pp. 122-33.
22. Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content (New York: Oxford, 1983), see pp. 204-05.
23. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, "The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism."
24. "Reference and Contingency," The Monist, LXII (1977): 161-89.
25. and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.
26. Jackson, "Why We Need A-intensions" (forthcoming).
27. Richard Holton introduced the Muggeltonians to philosophical discourse in his "Reason, Value, and the Muggletonians," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV (1996): 484-87.