The Nature of Epistemic Space

Epistemic Modality

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Chalmers, David J ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Information; Modality; Possibility; Possible world; Representation; Scenario

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921651257     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0003     Document Type: Chapter

References (32)

1. Ackermann, F. (1978). "De re propositional attitudes toward integers", Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9: 145-53.
2. Anderson, C. A. (2009a). "The lesson of Kaplan's paradox about possible world semantics", in J. Almog and P. Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
3. Austin, D. F. (1990). What's the Meaning of "This"? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
4. Bealer, G. (1982). Quality and Concept (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
5. Bealer, G. (1996). "A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy", Philosophical Studies 81: 121-42.
6. Bjerring, J. C. (2010). Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University.
7. Boolos, G. (1998). Logic, Logic, and Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
8. Burgess, J. (1997). "Quinus ab omni naevo vindicatus", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. 23: 25-66.
9. Cartwright, R. L. (1994). "Speaking of everything", Noûs 28: 1-20.
10. Chalmers, D. J. (2002a). "On sense and intension", Philosophical Perspectives 16: 135-82.
11. Chalmers, D. J. (2002b). "The components of content" (rev. version), in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
12. Chalmers, D. J. (2002c). "Does conceivability entail possibility?", in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
13. Chalmers, D. J. (2004). "Epistemic two-dimensional semantics", Philosophical Studies 118: 153-226.
14. Chalmers, D. J. (forthcoming a.) "Frege's puzzle and the objects of credence", http://consc.net/papers/%20credence.pdf.
15. Chalmers, D. J. (forthcoming b). "Propositions and attitude ascriptions: A Fregean account", Noûs. http://consc.net/papers/propositions.pdf.
16. Chalmers, D. J. and Jackson, F. (2001). "Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation", Philosophical Review 110: 315-60.
17. Cresswell, M. (2006). "From modal discourse to possible worlds", Studia Logica 82: 307-27.
18. Dummett, M. (1993). "What is mathematics about?", in The Seas of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
19. Fine, K. (2005). "Class and membership", Journal of Philosophy, 102: 545-72.
20. Fine, K. (2008a). "Relatively unrestricted quantification", in G. Uzquiano and A. Rayo (eds.), Absolute Generality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
21. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
22. Hintikka, J. (1975). "Impossible possible worlds vindicated", Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 475-84.
23. Jago, M. (2006). "Imagine the possibilities: Information without overload", Logique et Analyse 49: 345-71.
24. Kaplan, D. (1995a). "A problem in possible-world semantics", in W. Sinnott- Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
25. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
26. Kripke, S. A. (forthcoming). "A puzzle about time and thought", in Collected Papers vol. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
27. Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell).
28. Linnebo, O. (2008a). "Sets, properties, and unrestricted quantification", in G. Uzquiano and A. Rayo (eds.), Absolute Generality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
29. Rantala, V. (1975). "Urn models", Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 455-74.
30. Shapiro, S. (2003). "All sets great and small: And I do mean ALL", Philosophical Perspectives 17: 467-90.
31. Soames, S. (2004). Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
32. Whittle, B. (2009). "Epistemically possible worlds and propositions", Noûs 43: 265-85.