The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 57, Issue 229, 2007, Pages 650-666

  Frankish, Keith ^a  

^a Institute of Educational Technology

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949498164     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.510.x     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford UP, 1996)
2. 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 473-96
3. 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 247-72
4. 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 145-200
5. 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument', in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D. Stoljar (eds), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (MIT Press, 2004), pp. 269-98
6. 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', in his The Character of Consciousness (Oxford UP, forthcoming; pre-publication version available at http://consc.net/papers/2dargument.html)
7. I assume that a completed basic physics will deal in micro-level laws and entities, but nothing hangs on this assumption. If it should prove false, we might speak instead of the basic physical features
8. See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 94-5
9. See, e.g., Chalmers, 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', p. 249
10. For detailed discussion and defence of the CP thesis, see Chalmers, 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?'
11. For type-A positions, see, e.g., D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1968)
12. D.C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991)
13. R. Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2005)
14. D. Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches', in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519
15. For type-B positions, see, e.g., P. Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness: a Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge UP, 2000)
16. CS. Hill, 'Imaginability, Conceivability and the Mind-Body Problem', Philosophical Studies, 87 (1997), pp. 61-85
17. J. Levine, Purple Haze: the Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2001)
18. B. Loar, 'Phenomenal States', in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 597-616
19. W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience (MIT Press, 1996)
20. D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2002)
21. The idea that the zombists' weapons can be turned against themselves is not new, and both Peter Marton and Scott Sturgeon have employed versions of the strategy: see P. Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for Conceivability', Southwest Philosophy Review, 14 (1998), pp. 131-8
22. S. Sturgeon, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 115-16. However, their arguments, unlike the present one, take a metamodal form
23. S. Yablo, 'Concepts and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 455-63
24. Adapted from Chalmers, 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', online pre-publication version, §8
25. Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for Conceivability'; Sturgeon, Matters of Mind, pp. 115-16
26. See Chalmers, 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality' and 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism'
27. and 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', pp. 256-7, 265-7
28. See J. Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 72-7
29. By 'logically impossible' he means 'inconceivable': see 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality', p. 477
30. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 5th edn (London: Dent, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 146-7
31. See, e.g., Chalmers, 'The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Q Smith and A. Jokic (eds), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 220-72
32. Loar, 'Phenomenal States'
33. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness
34. Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
35. M. Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content (MIT Press, 2000)
36. and 'A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts', in A. O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons (Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 91-105
37. See also M. Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 136-7