Imitation and Learning

The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Alós Ferrer, Carlos ^a   Schlag, Karl H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Competing agents; Game theory; Imitation; Imitative behavior; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920752170     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0012     Document Type: Chapter

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