On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 133, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 295-315

  Balkenborg, Dieter ^a   Schlag, Karl H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Nash equilibrium component; Regular selection dynamics; Replicator dynamic; Strict equilibrium set

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847051341     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.008     Document Type: Article

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