Which one should I imitate?

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 493-522

  Schlag, Karl H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Aggregate monotone dynamic; C72; C79; Imitation; Multi armed bandit; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001208741     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00068-2     Document Type: Article

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