Cournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 193-217

  Alós Ferrer, Carlos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Cournot; Imitation; Memory; Mutation; Walras

Indexed keywords

COSTS; DECISION MAKING; INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE; MARKETING; PERTURBATION TECHNIQUES; SET THEORY; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

INSURANCE MARKETS; OLIGOPOLIES;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 0346640509     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.07.001     Document Type: Article

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