Social roles as an effective learning mechanism

Rationality and Society

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 371-397

  Schlag, Karl H ^a,b   Pollock, Gregory B ^c  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b European Institute   (Italy)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Evolution; Imitation; Improving; Random matching; Replicator dynamic; Sampling

Indexed keywords

EID: 22844455035     PISSN: 10434631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/104346399011004001     Document Type: Article

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