The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 28, Issue , 2014, Pages 6-25

  Ansari, Iram Fatima ^a,c   Goergen, Marc ^a,b   Mira, Svetlana ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b European Corporate Governance Institute   (Belgium)

^c SULTAN QABOOS UNIVERSITY   (Oman)

Author keywords

CEO succession; Corporate control and ownership; Corporate governance; Family firms; G32; G34

Indexed keywords

EID: 84908410266     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.006     Document Type: Article

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