Family ownership and CEO turnovers

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 1166-1190

  Chen, Xia ^a   Cheng, Qiang ^a   Dai, Zhonglan ^b  

^a SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884709502     PISSN: 08239150     EISSN: 19113846     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01185.x     Document Type: Article

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