Institutional formalism and realism in constitutional and public law

Supreme Court Review

Volumn 2013, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-54

  Pildes, Richard H ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84908332701     PISSN: 00819557     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1086/676638     Document Type: Article

References (192)

1. 133 S Ct 2612 (2013).
2. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Cal L Rev 273 (2011).
3. Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497 (2007).
4. For a recent summary of pure proceduralist theories, see Jamie Terence Kelly, Framing Democracy: A Behavioral Approach to Democratic Theory 46-49, 52-55 (Princeton, 2012);
5. see also David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, 2008).
6. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (1994);
7. for his own most recent restatement of that work, see Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 Wis L Rev 265.
8. Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism, 2013 Wis L Rev 607, 618 (internal quotation marks added).
9. See also Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 J L & Soc Inquiry 959, 964 (noting that Komesar does not address how to determine the comparative advantage of various institutions in "real-world settings").
10. On the issue of doctrinal change, see Adam M. Samaha, On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 Georgetown L J (forthcoming 2014), available online at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2389037.
11. For the critique that scholars adopt realist stances toward governance institutions, but then inconsistently make doctrinal recommendations on the assumption that judges are not motivated in ways similar to the actors in these other institutions, see Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U Chi L Rev 1743, 1745 (2013).
12. In addition to the good rejoinder in Charles L. Barzun, Getting Substantive: A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 Chi L Rev Dialogue 267(2014), my claim is that courts already do take institutional realism into account at times, but that it is illuminating to explore how they might and ought to do, whether courts are likely to do so in fact.
13. 344 US 443 (1953).
14. Compare, for example, Fay v Noia, 372 US 391 (1963)
15. with Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976);
16. Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72 (1977).
17. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362 (1953).
18. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441 (1963).
19. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv L Rev 1105 (1977).
20. See, for example, Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1457, 1487 (2005) ("Much discourse on parity is characterized by its static nature⋯. The better view is to examine parity as a fluid and dynamic concept, with changes-for good or ill-in both federal and state courts over time.").
21. William Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 Const Comm 599 (1999).
22. For Neuborne's own revisitation of these questions, which concludes that institutional factors continue to make federal courts function better than state courts in resolving close constitutional cases, see Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Use of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DePaul L Rev 797 (1995).
23. For good summaries of the empirical literature and debates on the "parity" question, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Court and the Federal System 278-83 (Foundation, 6th ed 2009);
24. Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 Colum L Rev 1211, 1221 n 25 (2004).
25. In Stone v Powell, Justice Powell wrote for the Court
26. 428 US 465, 493 n 35 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
27. Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 Vand L Rev 797, 819 (1992).
28. For the argument that we should not essentialize the judicial function, and should recognize that state courts differ structurally from federal courts in ways that do or should, for example, lead state courts to apply justiciability doctrines or rationality review differently from federal courts, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv L Rev 1833, 1909-15 (2001);
29. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv L Rev 1131, 1157-69 (1999).
30. 531 US 98 (2000).
31. Demorest v City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 US 36, 42 (1944).
32. For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum L Rev 1919 (2003).
33. See, for example, Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780 (1983).
34. Bouie v City of Columbia, 378 US 347 (1964);
35. NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958).
36. Bush v Gore, 531 US at 140.
37. See Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44, 85-86 (1996) (Stevens, J, dissenting).
38. 134 US 1 (1890).
39. For an explicitly realist self-account in this same era of the Court's own limited power, offered as a justification for the Court's decision making, see Giles v Harris, 189 US 475 (1903);
40. for discussion of that realism, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 Const Comm 295 (2000).
41. Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 69.
42. For a fuller account, see Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2311, 2321 (2006).
43. Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 at 21 (NYU, 4th ed 1957).
44. Jack L. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 (W. W. Norton, 2012).
45. Paul Kane, 113th Congress, Going Down in History for Its Inaction, Has a Critical December To-Do List, Washington Post (Dec. 1, 2013), online at http://goo.gl/GlatMz.
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. V Sawyer, 343 US 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J, concurring).
47. Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2315 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 30).
48. Youngstown, 343 US at 593 (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
49. 487 US 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J, dissenting).
50. Joseph Marguiles, Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power 152-53 (Simon & Schuster, 2006) (asserting that the photos' release "proved to be the most powerful amicus brief of all").
51. 542 US 507, 536 (2004).
52. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (W. W. Norton, 2007).
53. Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv L Rev 1381 (2012);
54. see also Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum L Rev 1097, 1132-49 (2013).
55. See, for example, Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763 (1950);
56. Hamdi, 542 US at 579 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
57. Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2354-56 (cited in note 30).
58. As samples of the immense scholarly literature on those questions, see Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L Rev 488 (1987);
59. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421 (1987);
60. Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale, 2008).
61. For the classic article on this shift, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1669 (1975).
62. For a more recent assessment of how judicial review could be redesigned to inhibit agency capture, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Courts and Regulatory Capture, in Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds, Preventing Capture: Special Interest Influence in Regulation, and How to Limit It (2013).
63. For detailed analysis of this question, see Jody Freeman and David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, forthcoming, Penn L Rev (2014).
64. Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, forthcoming, Tex L Rev (2014).
65. For good synthesis of the variations in agency design, see Richard Revesz and Kirti Datla, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L Rev 769 (2013);
66. Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Using Institutional Design to Limit Agency Capture, 89 Tex L Rev 15 (2010);
67. Lisa Schultz Bressman and Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 Vand L Rev 599 (2010).
68. Ralph Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Supreme Court Review 53.
69. Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. V NLRB, 522 US 359 (1998).
70. The Court was well aware of the view that the NLRB, unlike other agencies, "hides the ball" from the courts through "obfuscatory techniques" such as significant gaps between articulated standards in adjudication and their application; these claims were developed in Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 BU L Rev 387 (1995)
71. which the Court block-quoted from in its opinion, 522 US at 372-73.
72. Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections, 2013 Supreme Court Review (in this volume).
73. See Bruce Kraus and Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 Yale J Reg 289, 295 (2013);
74. Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv L Rev 994, 998 (2011).
75. In the recent Business Roundtable v SEC case, 647 F3d 1144 (DC Cir 2011), the DC Circuit held that SEC's Rule 14a-11, which would have required public companies to provide shareholders with information about shareholder-nominated candidates for their boards of directors, was "arbitrary and capricious" and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
76. Kraus and Raso, 30 Yale J Reg at 298, 300, 316.
77. Chevron U. S. A., Inc. V Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984).
78. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Peter L. Strauss, ed, Administrative Law Stories 398, 417 (Foundation, 2006).
79. Thomas Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833, 838-39 (2001).
80. The most significant, of course, is established in United States v Mead Corp., 533 US 218(2001), in which the Court indicated that Chevron deference should apply only to agency interpretations that have "the force of law", though a great deal of confusion reigns about precisely what that does or should mean.
81. See David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Supreme Court Review 201, 203-05 (arguing that Chevron deference should apply when the official to whom Congress has delegated statutory responsibility takes personal responsibility for the decision).
82. Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv L Rev 467 (2002);
83. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand L Rev 1443 (2005);
84. Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin L Rev 807 (2002).
85. Merrill, The Story of Chevron (cited in note 63).
86. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 Wis L Rev 411, 445.
87. 556 US 502 (2009).
88. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2375 (2001).
89. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum L Rev 1749, 1807-08 (2007).
90. Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2377 (cited in note 71).
91. Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n of the United States, Inc. V State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 US 29 (1983).
92. Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2380 (cited in note 71).
93. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va L Rev 889, 980-81 (2008).
94. William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Georgetown L J 1083, 1117-20 (2008).
95. Richard E. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex L Rev 499, 500 (2011).
96. See also Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 Tex L Rev (2011).
97. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 Wis L Rev 411, 427.
98. In support, Eskridge cites his own study of antitrust enforcement in William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 120-64 (Yale, 2010)
99. and Douglas Ginsburg and Leah Brannon, Antitrust Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, Competition Pol Intl, 3, 17-20 (Autumn 2007) (empirical analysis showing the central role of the Department of Justice in setting antitrust policy and persuading the judiciary, 1967-2006).
100. Catherine L. Fisk and Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L J 2013, 2083 (2009).
101. See also Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board's Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 BU L Rev 189, 248 (2009).
102. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency's Success in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 5 FIU L Rev 437, 451 (2010).
103. Eskridge and Baer, 96 Georgetown L J at 1083, 1173-74 (cited in note 79).
104. Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L J 984, 1043.
105. Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 US 134 (1944).
106. For the general view that during the Roberts Court the Chevron doctrine and related administrative law ones have failed to be applied in any consistent way, and that where Justices differ, the differences reflect ideological preferences about the substantive policies at issue, see Jack Michael Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-idp2382984.
107. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954).
108. 469 US 528 (1985).
109. Id at 565 n 9 (Powell, J, dissenting) (quoting Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984)).
110. See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 616 n 7 (2000);
111. Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (Harvard, 2006).
112. See United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia, J) (plurality) ("This venerable rule [of lenity] not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.
113. Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules 151-88 (Harvard, 2008).
114. For a related argument that the Court should employ similar default rules, motivated by similar "institutionally realist" considerations, in the constitutional domain, see John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla St U L Rev 825 (2006).
115. For an early reflection on these issues, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, The Relationship Between Theories of Legislatures and Theories of Statutory Interpretation, in the Rule of Law (Nomos, 1993).
116. See Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 Temple L Rev 425, 446 (1992);
117. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L J 331, 348 (1991).
118. Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules at 187 (cited in note 94).
119. ∗68 (forthcoming 2014), available online at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2358074.
120. Kareem U. Crayton and Terry Smith, Unteachable: Shelby County, Canonical Apostasies, and Ways Forward for the Voting Rights Act, available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract-id=2361495.
121. See the Voting Rights Amendments Act of 2014, HR 3899, 113th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 16, 2014)
122. and S 1945, 113th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 16, 2014).
123. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. V United States, 552 US 130, 139 (2008).
124. See Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand L Rev 647 (1999).
125. United States v Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 298 US 492, 500 (1936).
126. For a modern version of "implicit congressional ratification" of agency interpretation in a significant context, see Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 US 120 (2000).
127. For consideration of these issues, see James Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response, 93 Mich L Rev 1 (1994);
128. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich L Rev 67 (1988);
129. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Georgetown L J 1361 (1988).
130. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 NYU L Rev 921 (1992).
131. For a thoughtful reflection on these issues concerning statutory interpretation, see John F. Manning and Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 175 (Foundation, 2d ed 2013).
132. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw U L Rev 727 (2008).
133. See, for example, Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549 (1946).
134. US Const, Art I, § 4.
135. Colegrove, 328 US at 556.
136. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 259 (1962) (Clark, J, concurring).
137. 497 US 208 (1986).
138. Id at 244. A similar view is expressed in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Clingman v Beaver, 544 US 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and in judgment)
139. 539 US 461 (2003).
140. For a full account of the decision and its context, see Richard H. Pildes, Foreword-The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 28, 83-101 (2004);
141. for a contrary view on the case, see Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 Election L J 21 (2004).
142. Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US at 491.
143. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174 (2007).
144. Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 472 F3d 949, 954 (7th Cir 2007) (Evans, J, dissenting).
145. 553 US 181, 203 (2008).
146. For differing perspectives on these issues, compare Pildes, Foreword, 118 Harv L Rev at 55-56, 76, 141 (cited in note 118)
147. with Richard Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis L Rev 843.
148. Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan L Rev 643 (1998).
149. See also Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum L Rev 1710, 1713-14 (2004).
150. For that tetralogy of cases, see Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy 220-38 (Foundation, 4th ed 2012).
151. See Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197.
152. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard, 1980).
153. Sujit Choudhry, "He Had a Mandate": The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 Const Ct Rev 1 (2009).
154. For discussion of that issue, see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 Supreme Court Review 103.
155. 383 US 301 (1966).
156. The Act did include a precatory provision stating that Congress should "reconsider" Section 5 in fifteen years, 42 USC § 1973b (a) (7), (8) (2006 ed, Supp V), but the Act remained in effect without any need for subsequent reauthorization until 2031.
157. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2632 (Thomas, J, concurring).
158. For a good history of how this design came about, see Brian Landsberg, Free at Last to Vote: The Alabama Origins of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Kansas, 2007).
159. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2620-21.
160. See Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 69 (2003).
161. See An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 10, 19-20 (2006) (statement of Richard L. Hasen);
162. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2629.
163. See Voting Rights Amendments Act of 2014, HR 3899, 113th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 16, 2014)
164. and S 1945, 113th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 16, 2014).
165. Richard Pildes, Shelby Commentary: What Does the Court's Decision Mean? (SCOTUSblog, June 25, 2013), online at http://goo.gl/13sqXl.
166. For an excellent discussion of how the decision reflects "an end to the racial discrimination consensus" that existed in earlier decades, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute 21 (Jan 2014 manuscript, available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2377470).
167. ∗64 (US Feb. 27, 2013) (available online at http://goo.gl/hEKIQ6).
168. Mark Sherman, Ginsburg Says Push for Voter ID Laws Predictable (Associated Press, July 26, 2013), online at http://goo.gl/Bu1222.
169. For lengthy analysis of how Section 5 functioned in practice, see Rick Pildes and Dan Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The Gap Between Perception and Reality (Election Law Blog, Aug. 19, 2013), online at http://electionlawblog.org/?pp54521;
170. Rick Pildes and Dan Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The Gap Between Perception and Reality Part II (Election Law Blog, Aug. 21, 2013), online at http://electionlawblog.org/?pp54638.
171. See Richard Pildes, The Supreme Court Response to Congressional Avoidance (SCOTUSblog, Sept 12, 2012), online at http://goo.gl/4uKaow.
172. On constitutional baselines, see Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 1311 (2002).
173. James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion: Passage of the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J Legis 205, 233 (2007);
174. Persily, 117 Yale L J at 174, 195 (cited in note 120).
175. The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 10, 14 (2006) (Statement of Richard H. Pildes)
176. The Court quoted part of this testimony in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, 557 US 193, 204 (2009).
177. Persily, 117 Yale L J at 195 (cited in note 120);
178. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitution Theory, and the VRA, 117 Yale L J Pocket Part 148 (2007).
179. Ellen Katz et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U Mich J L Ref 643 (2006).
180. Adam Cox and Thomas Miles, Online VRA Symposium: Social Science Goes to Court (SCOTUSblog, Sep. 13, 2012), online at http://goo.gl/BLbqYd.
181. For a brief summary of the Cox/Miles critiques, see the blog post just cited; for the academic articles, see Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L Rev 1 (2008);
182. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108 Colum L Rev Sidebar 31 (2008);
183. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 76 U Chi L Rev 1493 (2008).
184. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2629.
185. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009).
186. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2644 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
187. Pildes, 117 Yale L J Pocket Part at 153 (cited in note 150).
188. Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2627.
189. ∗35 (cited in note 143).
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S Ct 2504 (No 08-322), at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/08-322.pdf.
191. See Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword-Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv L Rev 1 (2012).
192. See Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (1985).