Expanding chevron's domain: A comparative institutional analysis of the relative competence of courts and agencies to interpret statutes

Wisconsin Law Review

Volumn 2013, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 411-454

  Eskridge, William N ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878951475     PISSN: 0043650X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (121)

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2. see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
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10. see, for example, JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982
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12. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ch. 5 (1994
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32. Cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)
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35. E.g., Bruce R. Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2013)
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44. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 82-119 (2010
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47. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185.
48. E.g., Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984
49. Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2105 (2010
50. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 287-92 (1993)
51. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
52. Compare HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 219-20, 251 (2002)
53. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992))
54. Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 3, 17-20
55. David A. Skeel, Jr., Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 629.
56. see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392-94
58. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987)
59. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008)
60. Nina Mendelsohn, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004
61. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 209-11 (2004
62. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Boehner, American Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at SR6
63. Janet Hook & Carol E. Lee, Cliff Talks Down to the Wire-Both Sides to Meet at White House Today; Any Deal Is Likely to Be Limited, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at A1.
64. The Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952
65. see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008
66. and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988
67. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending the Routine: Methodology and Constitutional Values in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Statutory Cases, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 266, 276-77 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006
68. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (1984)
69. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682-90 (1975
70. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 260 (1998
71. see Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 334 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011
72. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125-31
73. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 1-15 (2010
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76. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161-92
77. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.
78. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
79. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501, 534-35 (2007)
80. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002
81. See Alex Acs & Charles Cameron, Regulatory Auditing at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm-dlv4/groups/public/@nyu-law-website-academics- colloquia-law-economics-and-politics/documents/documents/ecm-pro-073639.pdf
82. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Story of Gonzales v. Oregon: Death, Deference, Deliberation, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES
83. See generally R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 247-49 (1992)
84. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 308-13
85. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142-43 (2000
86. see William N. Eskridge, Jr., All about Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1049-57 (2001)
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90. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 130-34, 302-09 (1990
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93. The canons are collected in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. (4th ed. Supp. 2012)
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98. see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997)
99. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000)
100. see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2171-75 (2004
101. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (leading case
102. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
103. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
104. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984
105. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230-33 (2001)
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107. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843-44 (2012
108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (leading case
109. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234-35
110. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 263-64 (2006)
111. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 256-59 (2001)
112. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 587-90 (2002
113. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-22 (2002)
114. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984
115. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145-46 (2012
116. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
117. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000
118. See Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997)
119. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984
120. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORD. L. REV. 885, 886 & n.9 (2004
121. see Striderbikes, The PREbike vs. Tricycle/Training Wheels Experience, YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhHjyC-AXIE.