Comparative institutional analysis and a new legal realism

Wisconsin Law Review

Volumn 2013, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 607-628

  Shaffer, Gregory ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878923609     PISSN: 0043650X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (71)

1. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-6 (1994)
2. NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 174-77 (2001)
3. See, e.g., Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 345-56
4. Stewart Macaulay, The New versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used to Be," 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385, 388-92
5. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 136-37 (2009
6. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Vices and Virtues of New Legal Realist Theory and Practice 6-7, 15-16 (Sept. 16, 2012)
7. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 124-25 (1974
8. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 14-15 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1853
9. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 2-3, 377 (2001
10. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 4-5 (2006
11. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) [hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONS]
12. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 1, 5 (2005
13. See, e.g., James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, Preface to EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER xi, xii (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010
14. Glenn Morgan et al., Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 2-3 (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010
15. Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369, 369-71 (1999
16. See, e.g., JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 2-3 (2004) (providing an institutional sociology perspective
17. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 145 (2006
18. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 888.
19. E.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 470, 518-19 (1997
20. E.g., MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998
21. Miguel Poiares Maduro, From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional Approach for Global Governance, in 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 227, 227 (Douglas Lewis ed., 2006
22. E.g., Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4 (2008
23. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996
24. see also Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J INT'L L. 103, 107 (2011
25. DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 28-29 (2d ed. 2011
26. Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2007
27. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003)
28. see Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, Participation and Institutional Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 170 (Sandra Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2008)
29. see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 46 (1994)
30. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)
31. See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986
32. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984
33. See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004
34. Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1994 (1996
35. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 1-19 (1989
36. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991
37. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983)
38. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 75 (1992
39. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977)
40. see also Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3 (1993)
41. Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (1996
42. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron's Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411.
43. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 629, 634 (2004
44. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994
45. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010
46. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2059 (2006)
47. See Terrence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007
48. Max Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 362 (1925
49. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000
50. See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1975
51. see also Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 952 (1962
52. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 632, 641 (1963
53. Press Release, Columbia Law School, Judge Posner on the Economic Crisis (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/news- events/2008/november2008/posner
54. see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 5 (2009)
55. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 147 (1991
56. See Mathew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. 12 PERSP. 191, 197-98 (2009
57. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995
58. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005)
59. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236-37 (1931
60. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984)
61. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1401 (1996)
62. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 20-23 (John Cumming trans., 1972))
63. David M. Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3 (1989)
64. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14, 23 (1949)
65. See Patricia Ewick et al., Introduction to SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 1, 3 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999)
66. JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 24 (1960)
67. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012
68. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005)
69. Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 669 (2012
70. See, e.g., Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 483-84
71. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61-68 (2001).