Deconstructing independent agencies (and executive agencies)

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 769-843

  Datla, Kirti ^a   Revesz, Richard L ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878777105     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (205)

1. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1128-36 (2000)
2. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111 (1938).
3. See infra text accompanying note 54.
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2006) (CFTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (SEC); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB).
5. 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935).
6. See GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 327-42 (1924)
7. John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1112-19 (2000)
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 506-07 (1952)
9. Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 94-97 (2004)
10. see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1678-88 (1975)
11. See generally SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 86TH CONG., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 35-87 (Comm. Print 1960)
12. AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON LAW & THE ECON., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 78-80 (1979)
13. See also Louis L. Jaffe, The Independent Agency - A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1074 (1956)
14. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 31, 32 n.81 (2010)
15. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383; see infra text accompanying notes 25-27.
16. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 51
17. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583-87 (1984).
18. See infra Tables 1-7.
19. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 9, at 31-32, 32 n.81; Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1534-35 (2002);
20. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1995).
21. See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
22. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
23. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1138 & n.131 ("The critical element of independence is the protection - conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied - against removal except 'for cause.'"); Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010)
25. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001)
26. John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 953-54 (2001)
27. Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 470 n.39 (1994)
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 426 (1990)
29. Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 330 (1989)
30. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383.
31. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 62 (1941).
32. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, §§ 7-8, 25 Stat. 855, 861-62.
33. Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1130.
34. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 153 (1962)
35. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525-26 (2009)
36. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
37. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952)
38. See 295 U.S. at 628-29.
39. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 425 (2008)
40. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628.
41. J. Forrester Davison, The Place of the Federal Trade Commission in Administrative Law, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 287 (1940).
42. See, e.g., NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 826; Blinder, 855 F.2d at 681.
43. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 954 n.65 (1980)
44. See Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The 'Independence' of the Federal Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1958, at 22;
45. See generally Philip Elman, The Regulatory Process: A Personal View, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 901 (1970);
46. Louis J. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960);
47. Newton N. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 ADMIN. L. REV. 146 (1963).
48. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1997)
49. Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 203 (1986)
50. see Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987);
51. Matthew[sic] D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1989).
52. Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861).
53. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (2010).
54. Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2013).
55. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1173-81 (2012)
56. Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1831-38 (2012)
57. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, at v-ix (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GOVMAN-2011-10-05/pdf/GOVMAN-2011-10-05.pdf.
58. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 20 (2d ed. 1960)
59. See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1381 (2012).
60. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 604-05
61. See Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383
62. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110 (1994)
63. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2006)
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3) (2006).
65. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3158 (2010).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2006) (FLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (NLRB).
67. See WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 10 (1967)
68. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Vows Active Role in Staying On at Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at A20.
69. See Sewell Chan, Fed Chief Wins a Second Term Despite Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A1
70. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1214 (2009)
71. Cf. Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1734 (2006)
72. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Stops Consumer Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at B1.
73. More Calls for a Commission, Not a Director, at the CFPB, COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVICES BLOG (Oct. 21, 2011), http://financialservices.house.gov/Blog/? postid=265286.
74. See Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 809 (2010)
75. See Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt, Political Control of Independent Agencies: Evidence from the FCC 9-10 (July 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1640285
76. See Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique 22 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-04, 2008).
77. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 (2000).
78. See Joshua Kershner, Note, Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 615, 619 (2010)
79. See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997, at 46-52 (2003)
80. See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on Regulation 3-4 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://dho.stanford.edu/research/partisan.pdf.
81. See David C. Nixon, Appointment Delay for Vacancies on the Federal Communications Commission, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 483, 488 (2001)
82. David C. Nixon & Roisin M. Bentley, Appointment Delay and the Policy Environment of the National Transportation Safety Board, 37 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 679, 688-89 (2006)
83. See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 516, 80 Stat. 613 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 516).
84. As of 1978, Congress had authorized at least thirty-one executive and independent agencies to conduct at least some of their own litigation. See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1057 (1978).
85. See James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573 (1996).
86. Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 207-08 (1998).
87. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 588 (2003).
88. Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate Over Federal Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 71, 73 (1984)
89. JUDITH V. MAY, PROFESSIONALS AND CLIENTS: A CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 13 (1976)
90. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 186-87.
91. See Patricia M. Wald, "For the United States": Government Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 122-27 (1998)
92. See Auth. of the Special Counsel of the Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. to Litigate & Submit Legislation to Con., 8 Op. O.L.C. 30, 31-32 (1984).
93. See Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower Protection, 1988-1989 PUB. PAPERS 1391, 1391-92 (Oct. 26, 1988).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (2006).
95. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11- current-year/a-11-2011.pdf.
96. Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues That May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199, 1219 (1981);
97. see also 115 CONG. REC. 1836 (1969)
98. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d) (2006)
99. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2006)
100. See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 389-90, 400-02 (2004).
101. See Kenneth J. Meier, The Impact of Regulatory Organization Structure: IRCs or DRAs?, 3 S. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 427, 438 (1980)
102. Christopher G. Reddick, IRCs Versus DRAs: Budgetary Support for Economic and Social Regulation, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Winter 2003, at 21, 47-48
103. See Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1975).
104. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-19, REVISED LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE § 4 (1979), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-a019.
105. See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 659, 688-89 (2005)
106. See generally Richard E. Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 641, 643-47 (1954)
107. Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 479 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Edward R. Murray, Note, Beyond Bowsher: The Comptroller General's Account Settlement Authority and Separation of Powers, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 175 (1999)
109. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1157 (1984)
110. See Kenneth C. Cole, Presidential Influence on Independent Agencies, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1942, at 72-73
111. See Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government 102-03, 108-11 (2008).
112. David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 926 (1965).
113. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 901 (2008)
114. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 66 n.287 (2009)
115. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (2006).
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1).
117. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
118. see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402-05 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
119. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(j) (2006) (prohibiting ex parte contacts in Federal Trade Commission informal hearings); 14 C.F.R. § 300.2 (1983)
120. Cf. Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932)
121. Rulemaking Process at the FCC, FCC (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/ encyclopedia/rule making-process-fcc.
122. see generally Ex Parte Rules (2011), FCC (May 26, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/ex-parte-rules-2011.
123. Symposium, Independent Agencies - Independent from Whom?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 516 (1989) (statement of R. Gaull Silberman, former Vice-Chairman, EEOC).
124. Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1772 (1985).
125. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
126. See Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 362, 369-70 (2008)
127. For a discussion of various examples of how resignation threats can affect presidential policy, see Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2496-500, 2510-11, 2523-28 (2011).
128. See Ford Faces Decision on 'Common Situs Picketing,' NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Dec. 18, 1975, at 13
129. See Lee Dembart, President Intends to Veto Construction Picketing Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1975, at 1
130. See Gerald R. Ford, Statement Announcing Intention to Veto the Common Situs Picketing Bill, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 742, 743 (Dec. 22, 1975)
131. Philip Shabecoff, Dunlop, in Quitting Labor Post, Sees a Loss of Trust After Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1976, at 1
132. See Jim Anderson, Vance Says Iran Mission Was Last Straw in Rift, PITTSBURG PRESS, June 6, 1980, at A10.
133. Hedrick Smith, A Political Jolt for Carter: White House Fears That Resignation of Vance Could Cut Away Earlier Support for Iran Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1980, at A1.
134. See Editorial, Mr. Vance and His Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1980, at A22
135. See Bernard Gwertzman, The State of State Is Weary, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1980, at E2
136. Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 602 (1989).
137. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1300 (2006).
138. David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 431 (1997).
139. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
140. Todd Lochner, Note, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1993).
141. See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney Gen.: Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. 228, 229-31 (1977).
142. see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1382 (2010)
143. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 812-13 (1991).
144. Cf. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 213 (2010)
145. See Daniel Carpenter, Op-Ed., Free the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at A35.
146. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A1
147. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE. L.J. 257, 265.
148. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 208-12, 217-18 (1982)
149. See Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power of Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 334-39 (2010).
150. See, e.g., Jack H. Knott, The Fed Chairman as a Political Executive, 18 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 197, 207-09 (1986)
151. See Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 245-46
152. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(a), (c) (2006).
153. see Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 497 (2008)
154. See Floyd Norris, Levitt To Leave S.E.C. Early; Bush To Pick 4: Chairman Is Critical of Reform Opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at C1
155. E. Shiver, Jr., Arthur Levitt Jr. Is Clinton's Pick To Head SEC, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at D2
156. Jesse Westbrook, Cox Quits at SEC, Leaves Schapiro To Restore Clout (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 21, 2009, 8:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ apps/news?pid=email-en&refer=&sid=aJuH2AuRdpnA
157. see also Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government's Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 288 n.6 (1988)
158. Cf. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 919 n.23 (2009)
159. Charles T. Goodsell & Ceferina C. Gayo, Appointive Control of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 291, 301 (1971).
160. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.'s Embattled Chief Resigns in Wake of Latest Political Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002 at A1
161. William M. Blair, Conduct of F.C.C. Chief Is Studied by White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1960, at 1.
162. See William M. Blair, Doerfer Resigns as F.C.C. Chairman at President's Bid: Quits While Under Fire for Trip on TV Official's Yacht, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1960, at 1
163. See Paul Blustein, Tense Fed: Volcker's Fate Is Seen Hinging on Two Men New to Reserve Board, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1986, at 1
164. William R. Neikirk, Volcker Resigns As Fed Chief: Reagan Turns to Greenspan, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1987, at C1
165. See RICHARD BURLESON STEWART & JANE BLOOM STEWART, FUEL CYCLE TO NOWHERE: U.S. LAW AND POLICY ON NUCLEAR WASTE 33-34 (2011)
166. Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223, 232;
167. See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 47, at 55 (arguing that the executive power, which includes the removal power, lies completely with the President); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992)
168. A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994)
169. Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979)
170. Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006)
171. Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984-86 (1997)
172. 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
173. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2006); supra note 65 and accompanying text.
174. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
175. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992)
176. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 466.
177. The Brownlow Commission coined the term. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40 (1937)
178. Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 512 (1987).
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861) (question of Roberts, C.J.).
180. See In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 438-48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
181. 357 U.S. 349, 354 (1958)
182. 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988).
183. See 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
184. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3183 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (SEC); 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (FCC).
186. See supra Table 1.
187. See supra Part II.B.
188. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence 23-40 (July 10, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id=2103338.
189. For an argument that later cases have limited Wiener's precedential value, see Note, The SEC Is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-90 (2013).
190. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
191. 84 CONG. REC. 2306 (1939) (statement of Rep. John Cochran).
192. 84 CONG. REC. 2315 (1939) (statement of Rep. Lindsay C. Warren).
193. See COMM'N ON FED. PAPERWORK, THE REPORTS CLEARANCE PROCESS: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK 43 (1977).
194. See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502, 3507(f) (2006) (including independent agencies but creating a process for agency bypass of OMB denials).
195. Judith Miller, Congress Resisting Plans for Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1978, at 23
196. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994).
197. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011)
198. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642.
199. REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2011, H.R. REP. NO. 112-294, at 18-22 (2011).
200. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926, 926 (1974).
201. See Charles W. Vernon, III, Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 1138, 1151-52, 1152 n.87 (1977).
202. see also Martin Tolchin, Carter Orders Agencies to Cut Out the Jargon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1978, at A12
203. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323 (1986)
204. See Sally Katzen, Remarks at the Congressional Research Service Symposium on Presidential, Congressional, and Judicial Control of Rulemaking 20 (Sept. 11, 2006)
205. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988)