On the problem of legal change

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 97-155

  Samaha, Adam M ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84908480623     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (292)

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227. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20-26 (1998);
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233. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2001).
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240. I ignore the modest possibility of efficiency-enhancing changes that lack other effects on the content of legal decisions.
241. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
242. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211-12 (2004)
243. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012).
244. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 12-18 (2010);
245. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 63-65 (2005).
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254. Adam M. Samaha, Talk About Talking About Constitutional Law, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 788 & n.16 (collecting views).
255. Gareth Norris, Computer-Generated Exhibits: The Use and Abuse of Animations in Legal Proceedings, BRIEF, Spring 2011, at 10, 19;
256. Jennifer F. Novak, The Value of Simplifying Case Presentation, L.A. LAW, Feb. 2005, at 12, 12.
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277. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1371-72 (1993)
278. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1999).
279. Another approach to commensurability problems is a kind of nonnumerical considered judgment. My sense is that this alternative shares the prospect of overcoming an impasse on aggregation, although some people will reject it as a less transparent and less rational version of adopting a common metric. Regardless, a considered-judgment alternative likewise raises the question whether legal change is a concept with independent value.
280. One problem is getting evidence of expectations before a possible legal change to avoid retrospective reporting. If researchers do ask questions beforehand, the questioning can influence what is salient and expected. There also is the possibility that observers have no solid expectation within a range of conceivable outcomes. A careful effort to conceptualize varieties of legal uncertainty, with reference to ongoing empirical efforts to measure by survey, is Kevin E. Davis, The Concept of Legal Uncertainty (Nov. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
281. Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 907 (1988)
282. James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The Reliability and Validity of Shepard's Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 327, 328-29 (2000).
283. Botond Ko{combining double acute accent}szegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1133, 1134-35, 1141-43 (2006).
284. Olatunde Johnson, Commentary: Fisher's Big News: No Big News, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/fishers-big-news-no-big-news/.
285. Marc Galanter, Conceptualizing Legal Change and Its Effects: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal Change," 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 235 (1987).
286. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)
287. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2006)
288. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2014)
289. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 136 (2014).
290. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692-93 (2013).
291. An arguable devotee of law without change is Clarence Thomas, who appears to place little or no value on judicial precedent when it conflicts with his judgment about the Constitution's true meaning. Note, however, that a person could dispense with inquiries into legal change and consider only judicial precedent and never the Constitution's text. Thomas's ordering of legal authorities must come from commitments apart from change.
292. Transcript of Oral Argument at 73-74, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).