A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 55-72

  Dagan, Nir ^a   Serrano, Roberto ^b   Volij, Oscar ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030675537     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0526     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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