Stochastic stability for roommate markets

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 2218-2240

  Klaus, Bettina ^a   Klijn, Flip ^b   Walzl, Markus ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BAMBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

(Pairwise) stability; Core; Roommate markets; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649758493     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.006     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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