Potential games in volatile environments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 271-287

  Staudigl, Mathias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Markov process; Network co evolution; Potential game; Random graphs; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 79953295949     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.004     Document Type: Article

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