Corruption, development and the environment

Corruption, Development and the Environment

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-160

  Pellegrini, Lorenzo ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891460318     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-0599-9     Document Type: Book

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