Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility

Economics of Governance

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 143-160

  Schulze, Günther G ^a   Frank, Björn ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Corruption; Gender; Intrinsic motivation; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 1442280702     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s101010200059     Document Type: Article

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