Democracy, government spending, and economic growth: A political-economic explanation of the Barro-effect

Public Choice

Volumn 117, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 27-50

  Plümper, Thomas ^a   Martin, Christian W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642459121     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026112530744     Document Type: Review

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