Defining political corruption

Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 436-462

  Philp, Mark ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0005590024     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00090     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. My thanks are owed for comments on earlier drafts of this paper to my editor and fellow contributors, and to Jerry Cohen, Liz Frazer, Barry Hindess, Doug McEachern, Philip Pettit and Vicki Spencer. The final version was written while I was a Visiting Research Fellow, in the Humanities Research Centre of the Australian National University.
2. Section 8(1) identifies criteria of necessary conditions for conduct being corrupt (such as, adversely affecting the honest or impartial exercise of official functions, involving a breach of public trust, or the misuse of information of material acquired in the course of official functions). But these conditions do not constitute sufficient conditions for conduct being corrupt unless (under Section 9(1)) the conduct would constitute or involve, a criminal offence, a disciplinary offence, or reasonable grounds for dispensing with the services of a public official. The Commission, in effect, found that Greiner and the Minister for the Environment, Moore, had met the criterion of partiality under section 8 and that of reasonable grounds for dismissal in section 9.
3. See, the three ICAC reports, written by Ian Temby, the Commisioner: Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, June 1992); Second Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, September 1992); Integrity in Public Sector Recruitment (ICAC, Sydney, March, 1993).
4. See, the three ICAC reports, written by Ian Temby, the Commisioner: Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, June 1992); Second Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, September 1992); Integrity in Public Sector Recruitment (ICAC, Sydney, March, 1993).
5. See, the three ICAC reports, written by Ian Temby, the Commisioner: Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, June 1992); Second Report on Investigation into the Metherall Resignation and Appointment (ICAC, Sydney, September 1992); Integrity in Public Sector Recruitment (ICAC, Sydney, March, 1993).
6. ICAC, Report on Investigation into . . . Metherall, pp. 92-3.
7. See also the Discussion Paper, Recruitment of Former Members of Parliament to the Public Service and Related Issues (ICAC, Sydney, October 1992) and Ian Temby's 'Making government accountable: the New South Wales experience', unpublished paper to Edith Cowan University, W.A., 4.11. 1994.
8. See also the Discussion Paper, Recruitment of Former Members of Parliament to the Public Service and Related Issues (ICAC, Sydney, October 1992) and Ian Temby's 'Making government accountable: the New South Wales experience', unpublished paper to Edith Cowan University, W.A., 4.11. 1994.
9. Cf., Standards in Public Life: First report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Chairman Lord Nolan (HMSO, Cm 2850 I and II, May 1995), especially I, p. 14; and Dennis F. Thompson, 'Mediated corruption: the case of the Keating Five', American Political Science Review, 87(2), 1993, 369-81, and his Ethics in Congress: from Individual to Institutional Corruption (Washington DC, Brookings, 1995). In the Keating Five case, five members of Congress were accused of improperly assisting a major campaign contributor. However, they were not levying an income from Keating, and their lobbying in his favour was in many respects indistinguishable from the kind of lobbying which takes place throughout the American political process. Nonetheless, they were acting corruptly - a judgement based on a finely nuanced conception of what kinds of services a politician can perform for someone without undermining or side-stepping the democratic process as understood in contemporary America. In this, as in the Metherall case, it is not a requirement that the person acting in ways deemed corrupt was aware in advance that he or she was so doing.
10. Cf., Standards in Public Life: First report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Chairman Lord Nolan (HMSO, Cm 2850 I and II, May 1995), especially I, p. 14; and Dennis F. Thompson, 'Mediated corruption: the case of the Keating Five', American Political Science Review, 87(2), 1993, 369-81, and his Ethics in Congress: from Individual to Institutional Corruption (Washington DC, Brookings, 1995). In the Keating Five case, five members of Congress were accused of improperly assisting a major campaign contributor. However, they were not levying an income from Keating, and their lobbying in his favour was in many respects indistinguishable from the kind of lobbying which takes place throughout the American political process. Nonetheless, they were acting corruptly - a judgement based on a finely nuanced conception of what kinds of services a politician can perform for someone without undermining or side-stepping the democratic process as understood in contemporary America. In this, as in the Metherall case, it is not a requirement that the person acting in ways deemed corrupt was aware in advance that he or she was so doing.
11. Cf., Standards in Public Life: First report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Chairman Lord Nolan (HMSO, Cm 2850 I and II, May 1995), especially I, p. 14; and Dennis F. Thompson, 'Mediated corruption: the case of the Keating Five', American Political Science Review, 87(2), 1993, 369-81, and his Ethics in Congress: from Individual to Institutional Corruption (Washington DC, Brookings, 1995). In the Keating Five case, five members of Congress were accused of improperly assisting a major campaign contributor. However, they were not levying an income from Keating, and their lobbying in his favour was in many respects indistinguishable from the kind of lobbying which takes place throughout the American political process. Nonetheless, they were acting corruptly - a judgement based on a finely nuanced conception of what kinds of services a politician can perform for someone without undermining or side-stepping the democratic process as understood in contemporary America. In this, as in the Metherall case, it is not a requirement that the person acting in ways deemed corrupt was aware in advance that he or she was so doing.
12. Cf., ICAC, Second Report . . . Metherall . . ., p. 3.
13. ICAC, Second Report . . . Metherall . . . , p. 13.
14. Thompson, Ethics in Congress, p. 7.
15. ICAC, Defending the Fudamental Political Values of the Commonwealth Against Corruption (report for the Consideration of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Mauritius, November 1993), p. 3. Interestingly, no attempt is made to explain, or resolve, the inverted commas around 'right' and 'wrong'.
16. J. S. Nye, 'Political Corruption: a Cost-Benefit Analysis', in A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V. LeVine (eds), Political Corruption: a Handbook (New Brunswick NJ, Transaction, 1989), p. 966.
17. Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 10, emphasis added.
18. A claim cited and refuted by J. T. Noonan, Bribes (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1984), and commented on by Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 267.
19. A claim cited and refuted by J. T. Noonan, Bribes (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1984), and commented on by Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 267.
20. David Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes: some aspects of bribery in Greek politics', History of Political Thought, VI (1/2), 1985, 76-117, p. 86.
21. Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes', pp. 111 and 109.
22. Cf., Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (Routledge, London, 1993), p. 111.
23. Pepys is a very complex case - see Noonan, Bribes, pp. 366-91.
24. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption (New York, Academic, 1978), p. 7, Jens Chr. Andvig, 'The economics of corruption', Studi economici, 43, 1 (1991), 57-94 and, with Karl Ove Moene,' How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 13 (1990), 63-76. See also Francis T. Lui, 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986) 215-36, and Oliver Cadot, 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987) 223-44.
25. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption (New York, Academic, 1978), p. 7, Jens Chr. Andvig, 'The economics of corruption', Studi economici, 43, 1 (1991), 57-94 and, with Karl Ove Moene,' How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 13 (1990), 63-76. See also Francis T. Lui, 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986) 215-36, and Oliver Cadot, 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987) 223-44.
26. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption (New York, Academic, 1978), p. 7, Jens Chr. Andvig, 'The economics of corruption', Studi economici, 43, 1 (1991), 57-94 and, with Karl Ove Moene,' How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 13 (1990), 63-76. See also Francis T. Lui, 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986) 215-36, and Oliver Cadot, 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987) 223-44.
27. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption (New York, Academic, 1978), p. 7, Jens Chr. Andvig, 'The economics of corruption', Studi economici, 43, 1 (1991), 57-94 and, with Karl Ove Moene,' How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 13 (1990), 63-76. See also Francis T. Lui, 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986) 215-36, and Oliver Cadot, 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987) 223-44.
28. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption (New York, Academic, 1978), p. 7, Jens Chr. Andvig, 'The economics of corruption', Studi economici, 43, 1 (1991), 57-94 and, with Karl Ove Moene,' How corruption may corrupt', Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 13 (1990), 63-76. See also Francis T. Lui, 'A dynamic model of corruption deterrence', Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986) 215-36, and Oliver Cadot, 'Corruption as a gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987) 223-44.
29. Nathaniel Leff, 'Economic Development through Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 389.
30. Jacob van Klaveren, 'The Concept of Corruption', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption pp. 25-6.
31. Jacob van Klaveren, 'Corruption as a historical phenomenon', in Heidenheimer et al., Political Corruption, p. 75.
32. Edward Banfield, 'Corruption as a feature of governmental organisation', Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605, and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, August (1993), 599-617 use principal-agent terminology to explore corruption. On 'rent-seeking', see Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking (Aldershot, The Locke Institute, Edward Elgar, 1993).
33. Edward Banfield, 'Corruption as a feature of governmental organisation', Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605, and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, August (1993), 599-617 use principal-agent terminology to explore corruption. On 'rent-seeking', see Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking (Aldershot, The Locke Institute, Edward Elgar, 1993).
34. Edward Banfield, 'Corruption as a feature of governmental organisation', Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605, and Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, August (1993), 599-617 use principal-agent terminology to explore corruption. On 'rent-seeking', see Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking (Aldershot, The Locke Institute, Edward Elgar, 1993).
35. Banfield, 'Corruption as a feature of governmental organisation', p. 587-8.
36. Adam Przeworski, The State and Economy under Capitalism: Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics (New York, Harwood Academic, 1990), p. 23.
37. E.g., William C. Mitchell and Randy T. Simmons, Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy (Boulder CO, Westview, 1994), p. 66.
38. Although see James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge MA, Harvard, 1990), who suggests that maximum aggregate satisfaction can only be identified with a constitutional distribution of control over actions among agents.
39. See J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975) and my 'Liberalism and republicanism: on leadership and political order', Democratization 3 (4) (1996).
40. See J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975) and my 'Liberalism and republicanism: on leadership and political order', Democratization 3 (4) (1996).
41. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds), Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London, Duckworth, 1975), p. 4.
42. 'The authoritarian relation rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined place. Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992), p. 93.
43. Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), for example, suggests the Christian Democrats in the north effectively surrendered control of the party in the south to opportunists with Mafia connections.
44. Drawing on Pasquale Pasquino, 'Political theory of war and peace: Foucault and the history of modern political theory', Economy and Society, 22 (1) (1993), pp. 77-88; and Carl Schmitt (G. Schwab, trans.), The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1976). Although these accounts draw on concerns found in European and Anglo-American political thought, they are certainly not exclusive to these traditions.
45. Drawing on Pasquale Pasquino, 'Political theory of war and peace: Foucault and the history of modern political theory', Economy and Society, 22 (1) (1993), pp. 77-88; and Carl Schmitt (G. Schwab, trans.), The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1976). Although these accounts draw on concerns found in European and Anglo-American political thought, they are certainly not exclusive to these traditions.
46. See Patrick Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 958-73, J. Peter Euben, 'Corruption', in Terence Ball, James Farrar and Russell Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).
47. See Patrick Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 958-73, J. Peter Euben, 'Corruption', in Terence Ball, James Farrar and Russell Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).
48. See Patrick Dobel, 'The corruption of a state', American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 958-73, J. Peter Euben, 'Corruption', in Terence Ball, James Farrar and Russell Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958).
49. See, for example, the intense debates within French liberal circles in the early nineteenth century, G. A. Kelly, The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tucqueville and French Liberalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
50. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 67.
51. Cited by Rune Slagstad, 'Liberal Constitutionalism and its Critics', in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 116.
52. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 32.
53. See Leo Strauss 'Comments on Carl Schmitt's Der Begriff Des Politischen given as an appendix to Schwab's translation of The Concept of the Political, pp. 98-9.
54. Schmitt's conception of the centrality and inevitability of the political is captured in his discussion of theories which suggest the eventual displacement of politics by economic exchange. 'A domination of men based on pure economics must appear a terrible deception if, by remaining nonpolitical, it thereby evades political responsibility and visibility. Exchange by no means precludes the possibility that one of the contractors experiences a disadvantage and that a system of mutual contracts finally deteriorates into a system of the worst exploitation and repression.' The Concept of the Political, p. 77.
55. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 61.
56. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, pp.65 and 32.
57. Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes's Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1988).
58. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 68.
59. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 71.
60. This has to be understood as a first move in the argument. There are accounts of the political, such as the Aristotelian, which ground its ethical value in the particular way of life it offers its participants. But it should be recognized that Aristotle's account assumed that slaves and mechanics were incapable of political life. We thus risk a trade-off between the force of the ethical pull which a theory delivers and its inclusiveness. Taking the view I have adopted here seems closer to one central feature of the western liberal tradition (which Judith Shklar described as 'The liberalism of fear', in Nancy Rosenblum, Liberalism and Morality (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 21-38) than does the Aristotelian account, but it does leave open the question of how stable a political culture can be in which 'satisficing' on the avoidance of radical harm is the predominant motivation of citizens.
61. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: a Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1997).
62. See, for example, Toni Morrison (ed.), Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality (London, Chatto and Windus, 1993).
63. Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. VII.
64. Cf. William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington MA, Heath, 1974), ch. I.
65. The Court of Appeal majority judgement was that the Commissioner went beyond his jurisdiction in finding Greiner's behaviour 'reasonable grounds for dismissal' because the grounds for such a judgement must be legal and objective. The dissenting opinion was that the conduct could constitute reasonable grounds for dismissal. So the disagreement was not over whether the distinction should be drawn, nor over whether Greiner's conduct violated that distinction, but over whether the appropriate standards for judging reasonable grounds must be objective legal standards or can be more subjective and intuitive in character.
66. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society, pp. 268-72.
67. As clearly did happen in certain areas in Russia once the communist system began to fall apart - see Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (Carleton, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993).
68. This does not mean that the scope of politics is fixed. What was appropriate in the civil war in the USSR after the revolution was not necessarily appropriate later - the boundaries between, e.g., politics and economics are not set in stone.