Corruption's effect on growth and its transmission channels

Kyklos

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 429-456

  Pellegrini, Lorenzo ^a   Gerlagh, Reyer ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; ECONOMIC GROWTH; GROWTH RATE; INVESTMENT;

EID: 4143139690     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00261.x     Document Type: Article

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