Compliance, Detection, and Mergers and Acquisitions

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 7-8, 2013, Pages 514-528

  Ghosal, Vivek ^a,b,c   Sokol, D Daniel ^d,e  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b EBS BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^e GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890972487     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2626     Document Type: Article

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