Rogue Groups in Business

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 7-8, 2013, Pages 502-513

  Dnes, Antony ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891034977     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2625     Document Type: Article

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