Breaking up is hard to do: Determinants of cartel duration

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 455-492

  Levenstein, Margaret C ^a   Suslow, Valerie Y ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80655124356     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/657660     Document Type: Article

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