High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 281, Issue 1776, 2013, Pages

  Roos, Patrick ^a,b   Gelfand, Michele ^b   Nau, Dana ^a,b,c   Carr, Ryan ^a,b  

^a Institute of Advanced Computer Science   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Structured populations; Third party punishment

Indexed keywords

ACADEMIC RESEARCH; COMPARATIVE STUDY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; SOCIAL STRUCTURE;

EID: 84890070145     PISSN: 09628452     EISSN: 14712954     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2013.2661     Document Type: Article

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