New paradigm psychology of reasoning: An introduction to the special issue edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 249-265

  Elqayam, Shira ^a   Over, David E ^b  

^a DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Dual processing; New paradigm; Probability; Rationality; Utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887904225     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.841591     Document Type: Article

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