Counterfactuals and causal models: Introduction to the special issue

Cognitive Science

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 969-976

  Sloman, Steven A ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayes nets; Causal models; Counterfactuals; Judea Pearl

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES NETS; BAYES THEOREM; CAUSAL MODELS; COGNITION; COUNTERFACTUALS; HUMAN; JUDEA PEARL; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; THINKING;

BAYES NETS; CAUSAL MODELS; COUNTERFACTUALS; JUDEA PEARL;

BAYES THEOREM; COGNITION; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; THINKING;

EID: 84881531853     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12064     Document Type: Article

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