COMPARING STUDENTS TO WORKERS: THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL FRAMING ON BEHAVIOR IN DISTRIBUTION GAMES

Research in Experimental Economics

Volumn 10, Issue , 2004, Pages 261-289

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a   Burks, Stephen ^a   Verhoogen, Eric ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748480118     PISSN: 01932306     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0193-2306(04)10007-0     Document Type: Review

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